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RELIGIOUS DISESTABLISHMENT AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
JOSEPH M. SNEE, S. J.t
Mr. Justice Cardozo, concurring in Hamilton v. Regents,' assumed
that the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against
invasion by the nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against invasion by the states and, on this assumption, found that it
would invalidate any state law "respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."-- The regulation of
the University of California there in question was found, however, not
to infringe this assumed guarantee. It was not until 1940, almost
seventy-two years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
that the Supreme Court, in Cant well v. Connecticut,4 held that "it] he.
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment em-
braces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment,"5 and invali-
dated a state statute on the ground that it contravened the concept of
religious liberty thus protected.
Mr. Justice Roberts in the Cantwell case construed the "liberty" of
the Fourteenth Amendment to include both the establishment and the
free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.6 This unfortunate bit
of dictum, though sound enough if viewed in the light of his inter-
pretation of the establishment clausej has since led the Court down a
path strewm with further dicta on the establishment of religion sup-
posedly interdicted to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 If
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
2. Id. at 265.
3. Id. at 266. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." U.S. CONST. AM-ND. I.
4. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
5. Id. at :303.
6. Ibid.
7. He interprets the establishment clause in terms of religious freedom. See
p. 398 infra.
8. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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holding eventually follows upon dictum, the result will be a constitu-
tional faux Pas as historic and as embarrassing as that in Swift V.
Tyson," and one which may be as long lived. This paper frankly ques-
tions the validity of such indiscriminating incorporation of the two-
fold restriction of the First Amendment into the liberty clause of the
Fourteenth.
It is not intended here to discuss the broad question whether the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended thereby to incorpo-
rate bodily the first eight amendments-a question which has been
ably considered elsewhere.'0 Nor, assuming the concept of substantive
due process to be included in the restrictions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 would I deny that the word "liberty" in that Amend-
ment does and should include the fullest measure of personal religious
liberty. 2 Further, I take no issue with those who consider certain
types of establishment to be naturally and immediately an infringe-
ment of that religious liberty and hence forbidden to both federal and
state governments by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment
as read into the Fourteenth. 3
The precise question here is whether the religious freedom now
guaranteed against state interference under the liberty of the Four-
teenth Amendment places exactly the same restrictions upon state
action as are placed by the First Amendment upon federal activity-
not only under the free exercise clause but under the establishment
clause as well. First, it is essential to determine whether the two
clauses are synonymous or whether they can be distinguished. Sec-
ondly, if they can and should be distinguished, can the establishment
clause legitimately be read into the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment?
It is my contention that these two clauses of the First Amendment
can and must be distinguished, and that the establishment clause per
se 4 should not, and historically and logically cannot, be incorporated
9. 16 Pet. I (U.S. 1842). The Supreme Court sua sponte expressly overruled
this case as unconstitutional in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. Fairman and Morrison, Does the Fourteent Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REv. 5, 140 (1949).
11. See Note, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in
the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property,"
4 HAnv. L. REv. 365 (1891); Note, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926).
12. For earlier intimations to this effect in the Supreme Court, see Hamilton
v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 265, 266 (1934); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390(1923); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 67 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
13. For instance, the type of establishment considered in Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 342 (1890), or in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
14. I say "per se" because certain types of establishment would be forbidden
under the. Fourteenth Amendment, not because they are establishments, but be-
cause they are such as to infringe the religious liberty protected by that Amend-
ment.
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into the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The validity
of this contention must be sought in the history which led to the
adoption of the First Amendment in its present form as well as in the
judicial interpretation of the Amendment. A careful investigation of
these sources leads me to the conclusion that the establishment clause
of the First Amendment, as distinguished from the free exercise
clause, both in the mind of the framers of the Amendment and their
contemporaries, as well as in the judgment of the Supreme Court dur-
ing the last century, was meant to accomplish one or both of two pur-
poses. It is clearly regarded: (1) as a reservation of power to the
respective states; and (2) possibly as a politically wise means of fore-
stalling any abridgment of the religious freedom of the free exercise
clause on the part of the then suspect federal power. These two pur-
poses are found expressed side by side in the debates in the ratifying
conventions 5 and in the legislative history of the First Amendment.
Either purpose implies an intent to impose upon the federal govern-
ment a political duty, rather than to confer upon the citizen a consti-
tutional right,"; and what is not a constitutional right under the First
Amendment can hardly be a fundamental concept of liberty protected
by the Fourteenth!
Debates in the Ratifying Conventions
The debates in the ratifying conventions of the several states, and
the amendments which they proposed to the Constitution, show the
contemporary understanding of the relation of the federal govern-
ment to the subject of religion. The absence of a federal Bill of Rights
safeguarding, among other things, religious freedom was excused on
the ground that the federal government was one of delegated powers
only; that religion was one of the matters over which power had not
been so delegated and hence remained within the exclusive cognizance
of the respective states.
This general argument was made in Pennsylvania on 23 October
1787 by Mr. Wilson,,' and in Massachusetts on 23 January 1788 by Mr.
15. These debates are found in THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Elliot 2d ed. 1836). It is
unfortunate that there is no similar record of the debates on the First Amend-
ment, when this was submitted to the states for ratification.
16. Of course, a violation of this political duty by the federal government,
adversely affecting a citizen, would be indirectly a violation of his constitutional
rights under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. An analogous sit-
uation would be an attempt by the federal government to regulate wholly intra-
state commerce or internal property rights, or to take over completely the field
now covered by criminal laws of the states. Where there is no right to command,
there is no duty to obey. But in all these cases the federal government has no
right to command, not because of a constitutional guarantee running to the in-
dividual, but because only the state has the requisite right under the Constitution.
17. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 435, 436 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
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Bowdoin 8 and Mr. Parsons. 9 Other advocates of the Constitution
entered more fully into the precise question of religious freedom.
In Virginia, Patrick Henry objected strenuously to the absence of
a Bill of Rights in general, and of a guarantee of religious freedom in
particular2o-.probably because he found this not so much a stumbling
block as a convenient peg on which to hang his opposition to the whole
proposed Constitution. His objections were ably met by both Gover-
nor Randolph and James Madison in terms which left no doubt of
their own views on the relation of the federal government to religion.
Thus, on 10 June 1788, Governor Randolph, in reply to Patrick Henry,
found a guarantee of religious freedom in the prohibition against any
religious test21 and vitiated further difficulties in these words:
It has been said that, if the exclusion of the religious test were an
exception from the general power of Congress, the power over
religions would remain. I inform those who are of this opinion,
that no power is given expressly to Congress over religion. The
senators and representatives, members of the state legislatures,
and executive and judicial officers, are bound, by oath or affirma-
tion, to support this Constitution. This only binds them to sup-
port it in the exercise of the powers constitutionally given it.22
And on 15 June Governor Randolph again urged this lack of any
federal power over religion in reply to further objections by Mr.
Henry:
He [Patrick Henry] has added religion to the objects endan-
gered, in his conception. Is there any power given over it? Let it
be pointed out. Will he not be contented with the answer that has
been frequently given to that objection?... No part of the Con-
stitution, even if strictly construed, will justify a conclusion that
the general government can take away or impair the freedom of
religion.23
James Madison, whose views will be discussed later at greater
length, made the same point on 12 June 1788, again in reply to the
worrisome Patrick Henry:
There is not a shadow of right in the general government to inter-
meddle with religion. Its least interference with it would be a
most flagrant usurpation. 24
In the North Carolina debate on 30 July 1788, the same concept was
expressed by Mr. Iredell. North Carolina then had religious tolera-
18. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 87 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
19. 2 id. at 90, 93.
20. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 44, 314, 462, 587, 588 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
21. U.S. CONST. Art. VI.
22. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTiTUTION 204 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
23. 3 id. at 469.
24. 3 id. at 330.
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tion - but restricted the holding of state office to Protestants.2 IredeU
not only denies that any power over religion has been delegated by
the Constitution to the federal government, but does so in terms which
clearly suggest that he is considering both the right of the citizen to
religious freedom, and the right reserved to the state to require re-
ligious tests for office:
They [Congress) certainly have no authority to interfere in the
establishment of any religion whatsoever; and I am astonished
that any gentleman should conceive they have. Is there any power
given to Congress in matters of religion? Can they pass a single
act to impair our religious liberties? ... If any future Congress
should pass an act concerning the religion of the country, it would
be an act which they are not authorized to pass, by the Constitu-
tion, and which the people would not obey. Every one would ask,
"Who authorized the government to pass such an act? It is not
warranted by the Constitution, and is barefaced usurpation." The
power to make treaties can never be supposed to include a right
to establish a foreign religion among ourselves, though it might
authorize a toleration of others. 27
Iredell's choice of language is, I believe, significant. In his discus-
sion of the general authority of Congress, he does not speak of Con-
gress c.Ntablxshing a religion, but denies to it the authority "to inter-
fere in the establishment of any religion."' 8 Congress has no "power
. I . in attr cs of religion" and may not "pass an act concerning the
religion of the country."' ' - It is only when he comes to the authority
of Congress under the treaty-making power that he refers for the first
time to the possibility that Congress might establish a religion. This
was in reply to an objection raised by Mr. Henry Abbot. Iredell ad-
mits that, under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, 0 the treaty-
making power might be used to enforce toleration of minority sects
by the states. Read in context, he clearly implies thereby that this is
an exceptional encroachment upon a domain otherwise reserved to the
states; that religion is so reserved, and in no way delegated to the
federal government. The exception proves the rule. To ensure similar
protection to American citizens abroad, the treaty-making power
could be used to enforce toleration by the states of a sect regarded by
them as foreign, just as it may be used to force them to grant prop-
25. N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS Art. XIX (1776); N.C. CONsT. Art. XXXIV (1776).
26. N.C. CONsT. Art. XXXII (1776). In Article INT, Section 2 (1835), this pro-
vision was amended to make all Christians eligible. Article VI, Section 5 (1868),
made ineligible only those who "deny the being of Almighty God," a provisiot
which was retained (N.C. CONsT. Art. VI, § 8 (1876)), and is still the funda-
mental law of North Carolina.
27. 4 THE DEBATEs IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 194 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
28. Italics added.
29. Italics added. Quaere: Does the word "country" here embrace the thirteen
states or only North Carolina?
30. U.S. CoNsT. Art. VI.
31. Such provisions have often been included in treaties of the United States.
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erty rights to aliens.3 2 But it could no more use the treaty power to
establish a religion against the will of an individual state to have a
different religious establishment or none at all, than it could use that
power to regulate the whole field of property rights in the states. Both
are areas reserved for the exercise of state sovereignty.
The same concept of reservation is implicit in Iredell's reply to the
query why the Constitution did not guarantee religious freedom al-
though it required the federal government to guarantee to each state a
republican form of government.33 A federal republic could not long
endure if the individual states reserved to themselves the power to
establish within their borders an aristocracy or a monarchy, but it is
not inconsistent with such federation to reserve to the individual
states the power to determine their own polity in religious matters:
It has been asked by that respectable gentleman (Mr. Abbot)
what is the meaning of that part, where it is said that the United
States shall guaranty to every state in the Union a republican
form of government, and why guaranty of religious freedom was
not included. The meaning of the guaranty provided was this:
There being thirteen governments confederated upon a republi-
can principle, it was essential to the existence and harmony of the
confederacy that each should be a republican government, and
that no state should have a right to establish an aristocracy or
monarchy. That clause was therefore inserted to prevent any
state from establishing any government but a republican one.
Every one must be convinced of the mischief that would ensue, if
any state had a right to change its government to a monarchy.
If a monarchy was established in any one state, it would endeavor
to subvert the freedom of the others, and would, probably, by de-
grees succeed in it.... It is, then, necessary that the members of a
confederacy should have similar governments. But consistently
with this restriction, the states may make what changes in their
own governments they think proper. Had Congress undertaken
to guaranty religious freedom, or any particular species of it,
they would then have had a pretence to interfere in a subject
they have nothing to do with. Each state, so far as the clause in
question does not interfere, must be left to the operation of its
own principles. 34
In Iredell's concept, therefore, while Congress could not establish a
religion, neither could it disestablish a religion in the several states;
it could not even guarantee religious freedom in the states. On the
same day in North Carolina, Mr. Spaight, on the ground that Congress
had no power over the subject of religion, endeavored3  to allay the
32. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47
(1929); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258
(1890); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
33. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 4.
34. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON n THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 194, 195 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
35. 4 id. at 208.
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fears of Mr. Lenoir" that Congress might set up a system of eccle-
siastical courts under Article III of the Constitution.
It is clear from the debates in the ratifying conventions that many
of the most ardent supporters of the Constitution argued, and evi-
dently succeeded in convincing their colleagues, that religion was a
subject reserved to the states, over which the Constitution delegated
to the federal government no power whatsoever.
Their success is evinced by the failure in several states to propose
any amendments on religious freedom, and by the form which the
proposed amendments on this subject assumed in other states. This
is all the more striking in view of the vigorous debates on religious
freedom in the various state ratifying conventions. The nine amend-
ments proposed by Massachusetts" contained no mention of religion
at all. South Carolina, where the Protestant religion was declared in
so many words to be the established religion of the state38 was content
to suggest that the third section of Article VI of the Constitution be
amended to read: "but no other religious Test shall ever be re-
quired." 9 The Committee on Amendments in the Maryland Conven-
tion rejected the proposed amendment: "That there be no national
religion established by law; but that all persons be equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty."'4
In Virginia, the Committee Report on the Declaration of Rights and
on Amendments was accepted by the Convention and voted into the
ratification of the Constitution. The Committee, of which Madison
was a member, included in the declaration of rights a paragraph on
religious freedom taken from the Virginia Bill of Rights. 41 But sig-
nificantly, religious freedom was not the subject of any of the amend-
36. 4 id. at 203.
37. 1 id. at 322, 323.
38. S.C. CONST. Art. XXXVIII (1778). This provision betrays some of the
contemporary confusion between the establishment of a religious sect and the
incorporation of religious societies: when it was eliminated in Article VIII,Section 1, of the North Carolina Constitution (1790), it was felt necessary to
provide that this change did not affect property rights of the various religious
societies (S.C. CONST. Art. VIII, § 2 (1790)). The same confusion may be seen
in Madison's message vetoing a bill to incorporate an Episcopal church in Alexan-
dria, D.C. See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 982, 983 (1811). The same confusion is pres-
ent in the cases of Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804); Selden v.Overseers of Poor, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 127 (1840); and in state constitutional pro-
visions forbidding such incorporation. For the latter, see VA. CONST. Art. IV, §
32 (1850); VA. CONST. Art. IV, § 30 (1864); VA. CONST. Art. V, § 17 (1870);
VA. CONST. Art. IV, § 59 (1902); W. VA. CONST. Art. XI, § 2 (1861-63); W. VA.
CoNsT. Art. VI, § 47 (1872). This prohibition is still contained in the constitu-
tions of Virginia and West Virginia.
39. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 325 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
40. 2 id. at 552, 553. The Maryland convention did not propose any amend-
ments to Congress.
41. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 657-659 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836). The Virginia guarantee
of religious freedom is found in VA. BILL OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776).
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ments recommended by the Committee and proposed to Congress by
the Convention, probably because this was thought to be provided for
by the first of the amendments recommended and proposed, which
read:
That each state in the Union shall respectively retain every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution
delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the depart-
ments of the federal government. 2
The procedure adopted in Virginia was followed to the letter by
North Carolina 3 and Rhode Island," i.e., the inclusion of religious
freedom in the declaration of rights and its omission from the list
of proposed amendments, among which was, however, the "reserva-
tion of powers" amendment as proposed by Virginia.
Only New York 5 and New Hampshire-" made any definite recom-
mendations to Congress on the relation of the federal government to
the subject of religion. The declaration proposed by New York was:
That the people have an equal, natural, and unalienable right
freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, according to the
dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect or society ought
to be favored or established by law in preference to others. 47
The wording of the New Hampshire proposal reflects the same
policy whicli underlies the phrasing of the First Amendment, to which
it is very similar: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or
to infringe the rights of conscience."' "8 The reported debates shed no
light on why New Hampshire chose this phrasing, which is essentially
that of the Livermore formula to be presently examined. 9 New
Hampshire's constitution required, however, profession of the Prot-
estant religion as a qualification for the offices of state senator, rep-
resentative and governor,50 and impowered the state legislature to
authorize the municipalities to provide for the "support and mainte-
nance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality."'"
42. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTIrUION 659 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836). See also the Prezmbl, 3
id. at 656.
43. 4 id. at 242-247.
44. 1 id. at 334-337.
45. 1 id. at 328.
46. 1 id. at 326.
47. 1 id. at 328.
48. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
49. See p. 385 infra.
50. N.H. CONST. PART I SENATE (1784); Id, at PART II HOUSs OF REPRESEN-
TAT vs; Id. at PA= II COUNCm. These provisions were retained in N.H. CONST.
PART II, §§ XIV, XXIX, XLII (1792). The qualification was eliminated by an
amendment framed by a state convention in 1876 and ratified by the people on
13 March 1877. 4 ABmaCAx CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIc LAvS 2492
(Thorpe ed. 1909).
51. N.H. CONST. PART I, Art VI (1784); Id. at PART I, Art. VI (1792). This
provision is still to be found in the constitution of New Hampshire.
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It seems not unreasonable to infer that the precise wording of the
New Hampshire amendment was designed to prevent the federal gov-
ernment not only from infringing the liberty of New Hampshire
citizens by some other religious establishment but also from passing
any laws "touching" the then existing New Hampshire establishment.
The Drafting of the First Amendment
Considerable light is shed on the precise question now before us by
a careful investigation of the legislative history 2 of the First Amend-
ment from Madison's first introduction of proposed amendments"s on
8 June 1789 until they were sent in final form to President Washington
on 24 September 1789 for submission to the states.5' A discriminating
study of its history and context will, I believe, justify a conclusion
that the establishment clause was meant to reserve powers to the
several states, while the free exercise clause was meant to guarantee
religious liberty of the individual citizen against federal encroach-
ment.
Madison submitted his amendments, including the "Bill of Rights,"
to the House of Representatives on 8 June 1789. Two of his amend-
ments, the fourth and fifth, dealt expressly with the subject of re-
ligion. His fourth amendment was to be inserted in Article I, Section
9, of the Constitution*5 in the following terms:
... The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of re-
ligious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed. 6
His fifth amendment, to guarantee religious freedom against en-
croachment by the states, was to be inserted in Article I, Section 10,
of the Constitutions7 in this form:
No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the
freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."
52. The Supreme Court apparently attaches great importance to the legisla-
tive history of the First Amendment, as is evidenced by Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203(1948); and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
53. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 431-442 (1789). Madison proposed two amendments
to secure religious freedom. His fourth amendment restricted federal activity,
and his fifth amendment guarded against state action. For brevity I refer to
these in the text above as his "federal amendment" and "state amendment,"
respectively. His state amendment was eliminated by the Senate. His federal
amendment, as altered by the House, was the third of those actually submitted
to the states for ratification. The first two failing of ratification, this became our
present First Amendment. These facts lend a certain touch of ironic humor to
Mr. Justice Jackson's statement: "This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights
because it was first in the forefathers' minds. . . ." See Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
54. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 913, 914 (1789).
55. Under the rubric "Limitations upon Powers of Congress."
56. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789).
57. Under the rubric "Restrictions upon Powers of States."
58. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789).
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And finally he proposed a new article9 to the Constitution which,
after expressly providing for a separation of powers among the three
branches of the Federal Government, declared:
The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively.o
A comparison of these three amendments proposed by Mr. Madison,
especially in view of the theories which he had propounded in the
Virginia ratifying convention,6' leads to some interesting conclusions.
Both the federal and state amendments proposed by Mr. Madison
(his fourth and fifth amendments, respectively) protect the "equal
rights of conscience," the one against infringement by the federal
government, the other against violation by the states. But the federal
amendment placed further restrictions upon the exercise of federal
power, which the state amendment did not impose upon state com-
petence in the matter of religion. For the federal amendment ex-
pressly further commanded the federal government that "[t] he civil
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or wor-
ship, nor shall any national religion be established...."
When this difference is read in the context of his "reservation of
powers" amendment, it is clear that he concedes to the states power
over religious matters which he would deny to the federal Govern-
ment. This conclusion may be established on either of two grounds.
First, the federal amendment expressly declares that the federal gov-
ernment shall have no power to abridge civil rights on account of re-
ligious belief or worship, or to establish a national religion. Such
powers are, therefore, not delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution and hence, by the provisions of the "reservation" amend-
ment, are to be deemed reserved to the states respectively. Secondly,
while the state amendment prohibits the states from violating the
equal rights of conscience, it does not place upon them the further
restriction put by the federal amendment upon the federal govern-
ment. It does not forbid the states to abridge the civil rights of its
citizens on religious grounds (as clearly distinguished from "equal
rights of conscience"), nor does it forbid them to establish a religion,
provided only that the equal rights of conscience be not violated.
Since these powers are not prohibited to the states by the Constitu-
tion, they are, by the provisions of the "reservation" amendment, to be
deemed reserved to the states.
From the original draft of the amendments, as proposed by Madi-
son, two points are clear. First, in Madison's view, a law infringing or
59. To be called Art. VII, and the present Art. VII to be renumbered as Art.
VIII. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435, 436 (1789).
60. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (1789).
61. See p. 374 supra. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERA CONSTITUTION 330 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
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violating the equal rights of conscience is one thing; and a law which
abridges civil rights on religious grounds or establishes a religion is
quite another. Otherwise, it would be logically unsound to make the
distinction which he does make, in two juxtaposed amendments, be-
tween restrictions upon federal power and those upon state power. It
would betray not only unsound logic but faulty craftsmanship.62
Secondly, when the difference between these two amendments is read
in the light of the "reservation" amendment, the conclusion is in-
escapable that both amendments protect the religious liberty of the
citizen against encroachment by either federal or state governments,
while the state amendment has the added function of reserving to the
states certain other powers over the subject of religion, provided only
that there be no violation of the equal rights of conscience by any
state in the exercise of the powers thus reserved.
On 8 June 1789, Madison's amendments were referred to a Commit-
tee of the Whole,- but on 21 July 1789, after much argument,' it was
decided that the amendments should be referred instead to a select
committee, of which Madison was appointed a member.65 On 15
August 1789, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole
to consider the report of its select committee. The "reservation"
amendment was reported unchanged from Madison's original version,
but the two on the subject of religion had been altered by the commit-
tee. His fourth amendment, restricting the power of the federal gov-
ernment, now read:
".. . no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringed." 6
And Madison's fifth amendment, which placed restraints upon the
exercise of state power over religion, had undergone slight alteration
and was reported in the following form:
"... . no State shall infringe the equal rights of conscience, nor the
freedom of speech, or of the press, nor of the right of trial by
jury in criminal cases."6 7
Again, both amendments guarantee the equal rights of conscience
against infringements by either state or federal government, but only
the federal government is forbidden to establish a religion by law.
Taken in conjunction with the provisions of the "reservation" amend-
ment, the prohibition of an establishment of religion by the federal
government must be held to reserve this power to the states. Indeed,
62. See the remark of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947) (dissenting opinion), approving James Madison's con-
clusion that the First Amendment is a "Model of technical precision, and per-
spicuous brevity."
63. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 450 (1789).
64. 1 id. at 660-664.
65. 1 id. at 664, 665.
66. 1 id. at 729.
67. 1 id. at 755.
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one member of the select committee, Mr. Sherman (who had also been
a member of the Constitutional Convention), stated on the floor of the
House that he considered the fourth (federal) amendment unneces-
sary, "inasmuch as Congress had no authority whatever delegated to
them by the Constitution to make religious establishments."Ol8
In reply to the objection of Mr. Sylvester of New York, who feared
that the amendment "might be thought to have a tendency to abolish
religion altogether,"69 Mr. Madison gave his understanding of the
proposed amendment as it then stood, and for the first time intimates
that the prohibition against establishment may be regarded as a
means to secure religious freedom:
MR. MADISON said, he apprehended the meaning of the words
to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce
the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship
God in any manner contrary to their conscience. Whether the
words are necessary or not, he did not mean to say, but they had
been required by some of the State Conventions, who seemed to
entertain an opinion that . . . the clause of the Constitution,
which gave power to Congress to make all laws necessary and
proper to carry into execution the Constitution, and the laws
made under it, enabled them to make laws of such a nature as
might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a na-
tional religion; to prevent these effects he presumed the amend-
ment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the
nature of the language would admit.70
Two comments may be made on this explanation of the amendment
by Madison. When his construction is read in conjunction with the
accompanying restriction upon state power and the "reservation"
amendment, the question of establishment as such is still to be re-
garded as among the powers reserved to the states. In his view the
amendment expressly restricting federal activity in this field will
serve two purposes. It will prevent the federal government from using
the "necessary and proper" clause of the constitution 1 in order to pass
laws which might infringe the rights of conscience. It will prevent
the use of the same clause to establish a national religion. These
effects are in his mind distinguished. Both are by this amendment
reserved to the states. A later amendment is intended to prevent the
states from infringing the rights of conscience, but will leave them
free as to establishment.
Madison does, however, regard the question of establishment as
important; and it may be suggested that he believed it unwise policy
to allow the federal government to operate in the establishment field,
not only because this was a power reserved to the states, but also be-
68. 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 730 (1789).
69. 1 id. at 729.
70. 1 id. at 730.
71. U.S. CoNST. Art. I, § 8.
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cause of possible repercussions in the field of individual rights of
conscience. It is well known that he was opposed to the establishment
of a religion for this reason.72 Hence, it is all the more significant that
he never once suggested that the Constitution place such a restriction
upon the states to forbid them, as well as the federal government, to
"establish a religion," but was content with forbidding them to in-
fringe the equal rights of conscience. But in regard to the federal
government, which, after all, has no competence whatever in the
field of religion, he would go further. He would protect the rights
of conscience against infringement by both sovereignties, but in addi-
tion would lay upon the federal government a political duty which in
his mind would be a further protection of those rights. But duty and
right are clearly distinguished, and the mere fact that the duty is
meant to protect a right does not convert the duty itself into such a
right.
Madison's concept of the function of the establishment clause of the
federal amendment is strikingly clarified by his defense of the amend-
ment commanding that "no State shall infringe the equal rights of
conscience." Mr. Tucker of South Carolina, where the state constitu-
tion expressly established the "Christian Protestant religion,"7 3 ob-
jected to this restriction upon state power:
This is offered, I presume, as an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, but it goes only to the alteration of the con-
stitutions of particular states. It will be much better, I appre-
hend, to leave the State Governments to themselves, and not to
interfere with them more than we already do; and that is thought
by many to be rather too much. I therefore move, sir, to strike
out these words.I
Madison's reply in defense of his proposed restrictions upon state
power, and the reasons he advances for their adoption, are highly
significant in arriving at his understanding of the two proposed
amendments on the subject of religion, and especially of the function
of the establishment clause. His reply is thus reported:
MR. MADISON conceived this to be the most valuable amend-
ment in the whole list. If there were any reason to restrain the
Government of the United States from infringing upon these
essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be
secured against the State Governments. He thought that if they
provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide against
the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grateful to
the people.75
72. See MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessmwnts
in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Hunt ed. 1901), reprinted as appendix
to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947).
73. S.C. CoNsT. Art. XXXVIII (1778).
74. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 755 (1789).
75. Ibid.
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Madison, whose interpretation of the First Amendment seems to
carry great weight with the present Supreme Court,"' thought it
"equally necessary" to restrain both federal and state governments
"from infringing upon these essential rights." In attempting to ac-
complish this equally necessary purpose, he did not regard it as
essential that state governments as well as the federal should be
commanded by the Constitution that "no religion shall be established
by law." It is indeed stressing the obvious to conclude that, in his
mind at least, the two were quite distinct and that the establishment
of a religion by law is not per se an infringement of the equal rights
of conscience. Further, the prohibition against establishment is not a
prerequisite of religious freedom. Hence, however great his desire
to protect religious freedom-and he regarded the restriction upon
state power as "the most valuable amendment in the whole list"--he
would encroach upon the reserved power of the states only to the
extent necessary to protect the equal rights of conscience; he would
leave it to the individual states to adopt such measures in the field of
religion as they saw fit, provided only that they did not thereby in-
fringe those rights. It is highly unfortunate that, in view of the recent
judicial interpretation of the First Amendment as read into the Four-
teenth, it should now be necessary to stress the obvious !
A further objection was raised, despite Madison's explanation of
the federal amendment,77 by Mr. Huntington of Connecticut, who
feared that it might prevent the enforcement in a federal court of
contracts for the support of ministers or the building of meeting
houses.71 He prefaced his objection with a statement that has proved
prophetic:
MR. HUNTINGTON said that he feared ... that the words
might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the
cause of religion. He understood the amendment to mean what
had been expressed by the gentleman from Virginia [Madi-
son]; but others might find it convenient to put another con-
struction upon it. The ministers of their congregations to the
Eastward were maintained by the contributions of those who
belonged to their society; the expense of building meeting-houses
was contributed in the same manner. These things were regu-
lated by by-laws. If an action was brought before a Federal
Court on any of these cases, the person who neglected to perform
his engagements could not be compelled to do it; for a support of
ministers or building of places of worship might be construed into
a religious establishment.
By the charter of Rhode Island, no religion could be established
by law; he could give a history of the effects of such a regulation;
indeed the people were now enjoying the blessed fruits of it. He
76. See cases cited note 8 sura asi.
77. 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 730 (1789).
78. 1 id. at 730, 731.
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hoped, therefore, the amendment would be made in such a way as
to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights
of religion, but not to patronize those who professed no religion
at all. 79
Underlying the objection expressed by Huntington 0 and Sylvester81
was doubtless the fear that, while the amendment proposed would
prevent Congress from establishing a national religion, it did not ex-
pressly preclude Congress from forbidding state "religious establish-
ments" of the kind then existing in several states, nor from interfer-
ing with other state provisions on the subject of religion.12 I believe
this was why the House adopted the motion of Mr. Livermore of New
Hampshire that the federal amendment be changed to read: "Congress
shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of con-
science."83 This was essentially the same phraseology as in the amend-
ment proposed by the New Hampshire ratifying convention and
should be read in that context." The amendment was adopted in this
form on 15 August 1789.85
On 20 August 1789, on a motion of Mr. Ames of Massachusetts, the
fourth amendment was again altered to read: "Congress shall make
no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or
to infringe the rights of conscience" 6 The recorded debates do not
indicate why this alteration was proposed and adopted. The second
clause may have been inserted to protect religious worship or other
activity, with the fear that the clause "infringing the rights of con-
science" might be construed to protect only religious belief as such,
and not worship or other external expressions of that belief as well.
Nor is there any indication why the Livermore formula for the first
clause was abandoned and the amendment again phrased in terms of
a "law establishing religion," which, though it would prevent estab-
lishment of a national religion, again did not expressly preclude Con-
gress from prohibiting or interfering with state establishments. But,
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid. Huntington's reference to Rhode Island is ambiguous; it may be in-
tended as sarcasm in view of the unsettled conditions prevailing then in that
state.
81. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729 (1789).
82. Suggested by Crosskey, 2 PoTIcs AND THE CONSTIT0TION 1068 (1953).
For the type of provisions then in state constitutions, see DEL. CoNST. Arts. 22
and 29 (1776); MD. DEcL. OF RIGHTS Arts. XXXIII and XXXIV (1776); MD.
CONST. FORM OF GOVERNMENT Art. IV (1776); MAss. CONST. PART I, Arts. II,
III, and PART II, c. VI, Art. I (1780); N.J. CONST. Arts. XVIII and XIX (1776);
N.C. CoNsT. Arts. XXXII and XXXIV (1776); PA. CONST. FRAME OF GOVERN-
MENT § 10 (1776); PA. DEcL. OF RIGHTS Art. II (1776); S.C. CONST. Arts. III,
XII, XIII and XXXVIII (1778); VT. CONST. C. I, § III, and c. II, § IX (1777);
and provisions in N.H. CONS?. in text supported by notes 50 and 51 supra.
83. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (1789).
84. 1 THE DEBATEs IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THEFEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836). See p. 378 supra.
85. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (1789).
86. 1 id. at 76.
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whatever its motive, the Ames formula must also be read in con-
junction with the "reservation" amendment and that forbidding states
to infringe the equal rights of conscience. The inclusion of the estab-
lishment clause in the fourth amendment and its omission from the
fifth must still be explained and, in the light of the "reservation"
amendment, can be interpreted only as an express reservation of
power to the respective states.
The amendments to the Constitution were referred by the House to
a committee to be arranged.87 On 24 August 1789, the committee re-
ported its arrangement to the House, and it was ordered that an en-
grossed copy be sent to the Senate for their concurrence.88 The Annals
of Congress do not report the form given the amendments by the
committee on arrangement, but the three relevant amendments in the
copy received by the Senate read as follows:
"[Article III.] Congress shall make no law establishing Re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the
rights of conscience be infringed."
"[Article XIV.] No State shall infringe the right of trial by
Jury in criminal cases, nor the rights of conscience, nor the free-
dom of speech, or of the press."
"[Article XVII.] The powers not delegated by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively .... ,89
The fate of these amendments in the Senate has been but meagerly
reported, and there seems to be no record of the debates on the subject.
Though they were received by the Senate on 25 August 1789, it was
not until 3 September that Article III came before the Senate for
consideration. A motion was first made to amend this article to read
as follows:
"[Article III.] Congress shall make no law establishing One
Religious Sect or Society in preference to others, nor shall the
rights of conscience be infringed."90
This motion was defeated, but on motion for reconsideration it passed
in the affirmative. It was then moved that the whole article be stricken
out, but this motion was also defeated.9 1 The.Senate then rejected two
motions to amend the article as follows:
"[Article III.] ... Congress shall not make any law, infringing
the rights of conscience, or establishing any Religious Sect or
Society...." [First motion.]
"[Article III.] ... Congress shall make no law establishing any
particular denomination of religion in preference to another, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of con-
science be infringed.... .,,2 [Second motion.]
87. 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 778 (1789).
88. 1 id. at 779.
89. JoURNA OF TH FmsT SssioN OF THE SENATi 104, 106 (1802).
90. Id. at 116.
91. Ibid.
92. Id. at 116, 117.
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On the question of approving the third article as it came from the
House of Representatives, the Senate again voted in the negative23 A
motion was then made and carried to strike out the words "nor shall
the rights of conscience be infringed," and with this modification the
Senate approved the third article as proposed by the House.4 On 7
September the Senate considered Article XIV, restricting state power
over religion, and rejected the proposed amendment to that effect9
On the same day the "reservation" amendment, Article XVII, was
altered by the Senate and approved in these terms:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."'
What reasons were advanced in debate for these alterations, and
why the Senate rejected several of them, we may never know. It is
clear, however, that all of them labored under the difficulty which the
Livermore formula was meant to prevent: they did not expressly pre-
clude Congress from interfering with state sovereignty by prohibiting
or regulating state establishments or state legislation on the subject
of religion. This objection could also be raised against the formula
finally adopted by the Senate on 9 September 1789, which read:
"... Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith
or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion,
or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and petition to the Government
for the redress of grievances .... "1
The House disagreed with alterations made by the Senate in this
and other amendments, and so both the Senate and the House ap-
pointed managers for a conference upon the amendments disagreed
to. Mr. Madison, MNr. Sherman and Mr. Vining were appointed by the
House,91 while Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Carroll and Mr. Paterson acted for
the Senate." * The records of this conference have unfortunately not
been preserved, but it resulted in the following formula for what is
now the First Amendment:
"... Congress shall make no Law RESPECTING AN ESTABLISH-
MENT OF RELIGION, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of Speech, or of the Press; or the right of
the People peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for
a redress of Grievances. . ... ,10
The Senate had already rejected the amendment forbidding state
interference with these liberties-another point on which there was
93. Id. at 117.
94. Ibid.
95. Id. at 121.
96. Id. at 123.
97. Id. at 129.
98. Id. at 141, 142; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 905 (1789).
99. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF TE SENATE 142 (1802).
100. Id. at 145.
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disagreement between House and Senate. In a message to the Senate,
however, the House informed the Senate that they would recede from
all their disagreements-they had refused to accept sixteen of the
twenty-six alterations proposed by the Senate1 0 -and would approve
the amendments as altered and changed by the Senate, provided the
Senate would also agree to phrase the restriction on Congressional
power in the third article as agreed on by the conference.10 2 It is clear
that the only part of this article in dispute was that which referred to
matters of religion.
After agreement by the Senate,103 this was the form in which the
amendment was submitted to the states and ratified by them. The vital
question is why the House was so insistent on this particular form of
words. We have already seen the dissatisfaction in the House with the
earlier formula which, in spite of the contrast with the restrictions
upon state power and in spite of the conjunction of these two amend-
ments with the "reservation" amendment, some feared might be con-
strued to allow Congress to interfere with existing state establish-
ments or state legislation on religious matters. Once the Senate had
rejected the restrictions on state power, with their startling contrast
to the restriction placed on the federal government, the danger became
more real that, despite the "reservation" amendment, Congress might
assume to itself under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Con-
stitution the power to interfere with the exclusive competence of the
states over religion.
In any case, however, whatever may have been the effect of the
Senate's rejection of the amendment limiting state power over re-
ligion, the formula insisted upon by the House as an essential condi-
tion for agreement as to other changes demanded by the Senate is
clearly a return to the concept of the Livermore formula. This was
meant to reserve to the states any and all power over religion, pro-
vided only that the equal rights of conscience were not thereby in-
fringed. Now that the latter restriction (Madison's fifth amendment)
had been removed, the states were left absolutely free to legislate on
the subject of religion. Congress could not prohibit the free exercise
of religion, but it was left powerless to interfere with the states if
they chose to do so. Only the establishment clause, as an explication
of the general reservation of power in the Tenth Amendment, explains
this Congressional impotence. It would be more than naive to suggest
that Congress was unable to protect the religious liberty of American
citizens against state action on the ground that it was forbidden "to
prohibit the free exercise" of religion!
101. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SEssION OF THE SENATE 141 (1802).
102. Id. at 148; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 913 (1789).
103. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 150 (1802).
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The First Amendment, therefore, is not only an express guarantee
of personal religious freedom against the threat of federal action, but
also an application of the principle of federalism. The two purposes
must be clearly and unequivocally distinguished, as must the two
clauses in which these purposes are separately expressed. The two
clauses together were intended10 to remove the subject of religion
completely from the federal competence. Much ink has been spilt
over Jefferson's metaphorical description of the First Amendment as
building a wall of separation.'5 As Cardozo once remarked, a meta-
phor is indeed a dangerous and shifting foundation for a rule of law,
but at the risk of making confusion worse confounded, I make bold
to suggest that the First Amendment built not one, but two walls of
separation. It built a wall between the federal government and the
American citizen, because it forbade Congress to make any law "pro-
hibiting the free exercise" of his chosen religion.1°6 When Congress
was further forbidden to make any "law respecting an establishment
of religion," a second wall was built. But, in the mind of the framers
of the First Amendment, the establishment clause drew a line of de-
marcation, not between federal power and personal freedom, but be-
tween federal and state sovereignty. It is difficult to understand by
what logical or historical tour de force the wall erected by the estab-
lishment clause between those two sovereignties, which left the states
free to interfere at will with the religious freedom of their own citi-
zens, can be construed to be a positive guarantee of religious freedom.
The establishment clause expressly made it impossible for the federal
government to give to the American citizen positive protection in the
exercise of the very freedom which by the free exercise clause it was
forbidden to infringe; this was something reserved to the states. By
what magical metamorphosis does a clause which, under the First
Amendment, is expressly a reservation of power to the states, become
a denial of that very power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment?
104. An expanding concept of federal jurisdiction has, of course, led the
federal government into areas which at that time were regarded as completely
reserved to the states. This expanding concept will be reflected, of course, i
the reservation effected by the establishment clause, as discussed later in this
paper.
105. THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518, 519 (Padover ed. 1943).
106. That Jefferson, in his letter to the Danbury Baptists, was dealing with
this first wall of separation is clear from even a casual reading of the document:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and
not opinions ....
Ibid. None of these truths give rise to "establishment" problems, unless the
establishment clause be given the peculiar interpretation which it received from
Mr. Justice Roberts in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Justice
Roberts' construction of the clause will be considered later in this paper.
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The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
In view of the extreme, and perhaps exaggerated, importance which
has been attached by the Supreme Court to the opinions of both Jeffer-
son and Madison on the meaning of the First Amendment,107 some
comment may well be made here on Madison's Report on the Virginia
Resolutions0 8 and on Jefferson's draft of the Kentucky Resolutions00
for the light they shed on the meaning of the First Amendment.
Both the Virginia and the Kentucky Resolutions were drafted to
be presented by those respective state legislatures to Congress in
protest against the Alien and Sedition Laws, which were claimed to
be an encroachment by Congress into areas forbidden to it by the
Constitution. Both Madison and Jefferson rely heavily upon the
analogy of the protection given to free speech and press with the
restrictions put on Congress in the matter of religion. Their argu-
ment is that federal encroachment in the field of speech and press
will set a dangerous precedent likely to lead to similar encroachment
in the sphere of religion. By looking at the obverse of that coin,
we may gather from their comparison of the two areas just what
they considered to be forbidden to Congress by the' restriction in
religious matters. Madison, in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions
to the 1799-1800 session of the House of Delegates, rests his analogy
upon four grounds, which are worth quoting here at length:
First, Both of these rights, the liberty of conscience, and of
the press, rest equally on the original ground of not being dele-
gated by the Constitution, and consequently withheld from the
goverment. Any construction, therefore, that would attack
this original security for the one, must have the like effect on
the other.
Secondly, They are both equally secured by the supplement
to the Constitution; being both included in the same amend-
ment, made at the same time and by the same authority. Any
construction or argument, then, which would turn the amend-
ment into a grant or acknowledgement of power, with respect
t6 the press, might be equally applied to the freedom of religion.
Thirdly, If it be admitted that the extent of the freedom of
the press, secured by the amendment, is to be measured by the
common law on this subject, the same authority may be resorted
to for the standard which is to fix the extent of the "free exercise
of religion." It cannot be necessary to say what this standard
would be-whether the common law taken solely as the un-
written, or as varied by the written law of England.
107. E.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. MfcCollum V.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
108. 4 THa DEsATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FuEuEAL
CONSTITUTION 546-580 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
z 109. 4 id. at 540-545.
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Fourthly, If the words and phrases in the amendment are to be
considered as chosen with a studied discrimination, which yields
an argument for a power over the press, under the limitation
that its freedom be not abridged, the same argument results
from the same consideration, for a power over the exercise of
religion, under the limitation that its freedom be not prohibited.
For, if Congress may regulate the freedom of the press, pro-
vided they do not abridge it, because it is said only, "they shall
not abridge it," and is not said "they shall make no law respect-
ing it," the analogy of reasoning is conclusive, that Congress
may regulate, and even abridge, the free exercise of religion,
provided they do not prohibit it; because it is said only, "they
shall not prohibit it ;" and is not said, "they shall make no law
respecting, or no law abridging it.'' ,-
His first two arguments need no further explanation, but the
third and fourth merit fuller comment. In his third ground he
argues that, if the common law restrictions on freedom of the press
can be applied, then the common law restrictions upon freedom of
religion are also applicable. But it is important to note the scope
of the argument. Madison does not deny that the common law
restrictions can be applied to religion any more than he denies they
can be applied to the press. What he does deny is that they can be
applied by the federal government. The states are still competent
to act in both areas. The reason why Congress cannot validly act
in either sphere is not because these two freedoms are per se
inviolable, but because their positive protection and their regulation
is reserved to the states. Freedom of religion is used as the analogue
and freedom of press as the analogate, because religion is not only
protected from federal interference by the free exercise clause-
where it stands on an equal footing with the freedom of press
clause-but is also completely and expressly removed in toto from
federal competence by the establishment clause reserving it entirely
to state jurisdiction.
In his fourth argument Madison takes a further step. Here he
considers the First Amendment as a whole and concludes that each
and every clause is a removal of these subjects from federal jurisdic-
tion and a reservation to the states of all power over them. Congress
is not merely forbidden to regulate the freedom of the press, provided
it does not abridge that freedom; but freedom of the press is simply
not subject to Congressional legislative jurisdiction, because its
regulation, or even its abridgment, is a power reserved to the states:
the clause is an application of the principle of federalism and only
thereby a guarantee of freedom of the press against federal en-
croachment. The press need not fear restriction by Congress simply
because Congress has no jurisdiction over the press. The same may
110. 4 id. at .577.
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be said of the command that Congress shall not prohibit the free
exercise of religion, and in this latter case Madison bolsters his
argument by the complete reservation of such jurisdiction to the
states under the establishment clause.
Madison's extreme view is, of course, today untenable. He did
not foresee the relations which would necessarily arise between
these freedoms and the United States government, with an expand-
ing concept of the extent of federal jurisdiction. He never con-
ceived of the possibility of federal legislation regarding the press
under the power, for instance, of prohibiting and penalizing the use
of the mails for the transmission of obscene or fraudulent matter,
any more than he envisaged the issues arising in cases like United
States v. Ballard,""' or Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp,12 or Municipality
of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.113 The problems of
federalism in those good old days were a relatively simple matter.
But here we are not concerned with the correctness of his views of
federal-state relations or of his comparison between freedom of the
press and religious freedom, but only with the light those views shed
on his understanding of the effect of the first two clauses of the
First Amendment, and of the distinction between the establishment
and free exercise clauses.
Jefferson expresses almost identical views in his Kentucky Resolu-
tions, which he drafted for the Kentucky legislature in protest against
the federal Alien and Sedition Laws of 14 July 1798, and which were
adopted on 10 November 1798, by the Kentucky House of Representa-
tives.114
The Establishment Clause as a Political Duty
The legislative history of the First Amendment and the expression
of contemporary views would indicate that the establishment clause
was meant by its framers to remove the whole subject of religion
from the jurisdiction of the federal government and to make it
exclusively a matter for state cognizance. By reserving this power
to the states, the establishment clause imposed a political duty upon
the federal government without directly conferring a constitutional
right upon the citizen,115 while the free exercise clause directly
guaranteed to the citizen a right of religious freedom against en-
croachment by the federal government.
That there may also have been a secondary purpose for the estab-
lishment clause is not denied. It is quite likely that Madison had in
111. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
112. 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
113. 210 U.S. 296 (1908).
114. 4 THE DEBATEs IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON TH ADOPTION OF TH FEDERAL
CONsTITUTIoN 540, 541 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
115. See note 16 supra.
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mind the reasons given in his Remonstrance,16 where he argued
against the Virginia establishment as a danger to religious freedom.
The same concept is implied in Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptists. 17 By removing questions of religion from federal jurisdic-
tion, not only was a power reserved to the states, but there was an
added safeguard against federal encroachment upon the free exercise
of religion. The establishment clause, in this interpretation, is a
political duty designed to safeguard a constitutional right, but it
does not thereby become itself such a right.
Madison thought it "equally necessary" to secure religious free-
dom against state encroachment'" and offered an amendment for
this purpose.21 , But, as seen earlier, he evidently did not consider
this equal necessity to require, as an essential condition for religious
freedom, that the state governments be subjected to the same
restraint as the federal government in respect to religious establish-
ments. If he considered the establishment clause to be more than a
mere reservation of power to the states, it was because he deemed it
to be a wise policy designed as an additional safeguard for that
freedom, but not as part and parcel thereof. Thus is explained the
apparent inconsistency between his efforts toward complete disestab-
lishment in Virginia' 2 ' and his failure to include the establishment
clause in his fourth amendment to secure religious freedom from
state encroachment. As a member of the House of Representatives he
attempted to do with regard to the federal government exactly what
he tried to do as a Virginian with regard to religious freedom in that
state-he adopted what, in his mind, was the best way to guard
against any possible encroachment upon religious freedom, and
remove any power over religion as an added protection for "the
free exercise thereof." But this was not an essential constituent of
that freedom, and hence he would prohibit the states only from
infringing upon that freedom and not impose on them the political
measures which seemed to him best suited to safeguard that freedom
from any possible encroachment. That question he would leave to
the various state legislatures. The views expressed in his Remon-
strance and elsewhere are thus largely irrelevant to an understanding
of his concept of the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
There is some room for doubting the facile statement of Mr. Justice
Black, in Everson v. Board of Education,1-1 that "the provisions of
116. See note 72 supra.
117. See note 105, 106 supra.
118, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 755 (1789).
119. 1 Id. at 434, 755.
120. See MADISON, Letter to Henry Lee in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
288 (Hunt ed. 1901).
121. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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the First Amendment... had the same objective and were intended
to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on
religious liberty as the Virginia statute.'122
Religion and the States before the Fourteentk Amendment
Though the Supreme Court, in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,123
had held that the Fifth Amendment was not a restriction upon the
states, it was not until 1845, in Permoli v. First Municipality,24
that it considered whether the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment protected against state action. The Court decided there
was no such protection and stated its decision in language which left
no doubt that the protection and regulation of religious liberty was a
power reserved under the Constitution to the states:
The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens
of the respective States in their religious liberties; this is left
to the State constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition
imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect
on the States.12 s
Though the case does not expressly rely on the distinction between
the establishment and free exercise clauses, this distinction is implicit
in the holding of the case. By being precluded from "prohibiting
the free exercise" of religion, the federal government is not precluded
from protecting the citizen against the states in that exercise. It is
expressly so precluded precisely because it may "make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion." The principle of federalism
formed the basis for the Court's rejection20 of the contention that
state action violated the guarantees of religious freedom in the 1787
Northwest Ordinance%12 and in the 1811 Enabling Act for Louisiana.28
Of these statutes the Court said:
So far as they conferred political rights, and secured civil and
religious liberties (which are political rights), the laws of
Congress were all superseded by the state constitution; nor is
any part of them in force, unless they were adopted by the
constitution of Louisiana, as laws of the state. It is not possible
to maintain that the United States hold in trust, by force of the
ordinance, for the people of Louisiana, all the great elemental
122. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
123. 7 Pet. 243 (U.S. 1833).
124. 3 How. 589 (U.S. 1845).
125. Id. at 609.
126. Id. at 610.
127. 2 FEDERAL A)n STANTE CONSTITUTIONS 957 (Thorpe ed. 1909). Rights
guaranteed by this Ordinance of 1787 were extended to the Mississippi Territory
by the Act of April 7, 1798, 1 STAT. 549, 550 (1798) ; and by thd Act of March 2,
1805, 2 STAT. 329 (1805), the inhabitants of the Territory of Orleans (now the
State of Louisiana) acquired all the rights of the people of the Territory of
Mississippi.
128. Act of Feb. 20, 1811, 2 STAT. 641 (1811).
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principles, or any one of them, contained in the ordinance, and
secured to the people of the Orleans territory, during its exist-
ence.'h '
Provisions made, therefore, to protect the religious freedom of
the inhabitants of a territory, and even an enabling act requiring
minimal guarantees of religious freedom in the state to be admitted,1 30
could not operate to deprive the state of its exclusive competence,
for good or for evil, in the sphere of religion-a power reserved
by the Constitution to the several states.
The treaty of 1803 with France, ceding the Louisiana Territory
to the United States, also contained guarantees of religious freedom
for the inhabitants.Y, Counsel in the Permoli case did not argue the
applicability of these provisions. It would be interesting, but un-
rewarding, to speculate whether the Court would have held them to
be applicable.,1 There is, therefore, no case directly in point to
the effect that the federal government under its treaty-making
power might have interfered to a limited extent with state estab-
lishments-as had been suggested in the debates of the North Caro-
lina ratifying convention.'" The result, however, which might be
expected is indicated by Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church.134 The question there raised was whether the
Church in Puerto Rico had juridical personality, with capacity to
sue and be sued or to acquire and possess property, independently
of any incorporation by the government of the island. The Court
considered this question to be settled in the affirmative by the pro-
visions of Article 8 of the Treaty of Paris,1 35 which expressly secured
the existing capacity of ecclesiastical bodies in Puerto Rico and other
former Spanish territories to acquire and possess property. The
Court also took judicial notice of the position of the Holy See in
international law.
The case clearly involved federal action respecting an establish-
ment of religion. It secured to the Catholic Church in the former
Spanish territories the same juridical personality (at least as to
capacity to sue and be sued, and to acquire or hold property), as it
had possessed under Spanish law as the sole state-recognized church.
129, Permoli v. First Municipality, 3 How. 589, 610 (U.S. 1845).
130. It is interesting to note that it was not until 1868 that Louisiana enacted
a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. LA.CoNsT. tit. I, Art.12 (1868).
The earlier constitutions of 1812, 1845, 1852, and 1864 did not provide an express
guarantee.
131. Art. III. See 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1360 (Thorpe ed. 1909).
132. See construction given a similar treaty provision in The Late Corporation
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890).
133. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 191-192, 193-194 (Elliot 2d ed. 1836).
134. 210 U.S. 296 (1908).
135. 30 STAT. 1758 (1898).
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To some extent it gave a favored position to the Catholic Church,
since it was in fact the only religious body then legally existing in
Puerto Rico. But there could be no claim that this provision was one
which prohibited the free exercise of religion, provided at least that
the other religious bodies which later found their way into these
territories should be given the opportunity of acquiring legal per-
sonality by means of incorporation.
At the same time, there can be no doubt that the federal govern-
ment would be absolutely precluded from using even the treaty power
as a pretext for prohibiting the free exercise of religion in the
acquired territories, or in territories within the jurisdiction of
individual states. The difference can be explained only on the ground
that the establishment clause removed the question of religion from
the jurisdiction of the United States as an application of the principle
of federalism, and this reservation of power is subject to the excep-
tion of a legitimate use of the treaty power, just as is every other
power reserved to the respective states. A treaty might provide that
citizens or former citizens of a foreign power be guaranteed complete
religious liberty, and to that extent interfere with state sovereignty
and state establishments. Such would be a valid use of the treaty
power, and such agreements have frequently been made with foreign
nations.2s6 But, at least prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
federal government could not by agreement with a foreign nation
provide that all inhabitants of the individual states, whether foreign
nationals or American citizens, be granted the most complete re-
ligious freedom and that all state establishments be eliminated," 7
any more than it could thereby provide that inheritance throughout
the states should henceforth be per capita and not per stirpes. Nor
could a treaty ever operate to restrict the inhabitants of the several
states in the exercise of such religious freedom as was conferred by
the constitutions and laws of those states. The command that Con-
gress, or the federal government,38 shall not prohibit the free exercise
of religion is, within its proper scope, absolute and restricts that
government in the exercise of each and every power which it
possesses under the Constitution. No treaty could operate to prohibit
this free exercise of religion, because this is a constitutional guaran-
tee running from the federal government to every person within the
136. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Mexico Art. IX (1848) (1 FEDIa
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 381 (Thorpe ed. 1909)); Treaty Ceding Louisiana
Art. III (1803) (3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTITUTIONS 1360 (Thorpe ed. 1909)).
137. I prescind here from the question whether this might be done under the
treaty known as the United Nations Charter.
138. Although the words of the First Amendment refer only to Congress, there
can be no doubt that it was intended as a restriction upon all branches of the
federal government. Cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), where it
was applied to judicial proceedings.
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United States.' , That is not the case with the establishment clause.
This, like so many other clauses of the Constitution, draws a line
between federal and state sovereignty-a line which the federal
government may legitimately, per modum exceptionis, overstep in
the exercise of the treaty-making power.140
The Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment became effective in 1868. It was not
until 1940, almost seventy-two years later, that the Supreme Court
in Cantwell v. Connecticut'- expressly held that this Amendment
incorporated the religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment. The Cantwell decision, however, had already been fore-
shadowed by a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Berea
College v. Kentucky 1 and by dicta in Meyer v. Nebraska.43 Eleven
years after the Meyer dicta,"' the Supreme Court in Hamilton V.
Regents"' denied that students had a right, because of conscientious
scruples, to be exempted from military training at the University of
California. The Court there made this comment on the "liberty" of
the Fourteenth Amendment:
There need be no attempt to enumerate or comprehensively to
define what is included in the "liberty" protected by the due
process clause. Undoubtedly it does include the right to enter-
tain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach the
doctrines on which these students base their objections to the
order prescribing military training. 14
These cases, while intimating that religious freedom is protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment,4 7 do not do so by incorporating into
that Amendment the prohibitions of the First. The earliest sug-
gestion that this is, or should be, the case was made by Cardozo
concurring in Hamilton v. Regents:'4
I assume for present purposes that the religious liberty pro-
tected by the First Amendment against invasion by the nation
is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by
the states.
139. Language used in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115(1952), raises the interesting question whether the constitutional protection ex-
tends to those who are outside the jurisdiction of the United States.
140. See the classic case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
141. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
142. See 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
143. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
144. 1 omit mention of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), since
-- despite its religious overtones-it was not concerned with religious freedom.
145. 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
146. Id. at 262.
147. Contra: Brunswick-Balke-Collander Co. v. Evans, 228 Fed. 991 (D.C. Ore.
1916), appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 587 (1918); In re King, 46 Fed. 905, 912(C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1891).
148. See 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (concurring opinion).
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Accepting that premise, I cannot find in the respondents'
ordinance an obstruction by the state to "the free exercise" of
religion as the phrase was understood by the founders of the
nation, and by the generations that have followed. . . . The First
Amendment, if it be read into the Fourteenth, makes invalid
any state law "respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof." Instruction in military science
is not instruction in the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither
directly nor indirectly is government establishing a state religion
when it insists upon such training. Instruction in military
science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service,
is not an interference by the state with the free exercise of
religion when the liberties of the constitution are read in the
light of a century and a half of history during days of peace
and war. 49
The "incorporation" theory, whereby Cardozo for the first time
read into the Fourteenth Amendment the guarantee of religious
freedom as formulated in the First, was followed by Mr. Justice
Roberts' express holding to this effect in Cantwell v. Connecticut:
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that (the Four-
teenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent
as Congress to enact such laws. 1
Roberts here explains the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, as does Cardozo, in terms of the First Amendment
formula. Roberts and Cardozo include in the prohibition of the
Fourteenth Amendment both the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the First. But both of them explain the establishment
clause in terms of an establishment which is also of its very nature
an interference with the free exercise of religion. For Cardozo it
meant "government establishing a state religion," to which all
citizens would be compelled to subscribe; and he found against
petitioners on the ground that there was no "obstruction by the state
to 'the free exercise' of religion." Roberts, relying like Cardozo
on the similar interpretation given to establishment in Davis v.
Beason,252 also explains the forbidden establishment in terms which
clearly indicate a problem in religious liberty as such:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice
of any form of -worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom
149. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (concurring opinion).
150. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
151. Id. at 303.
152. 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)
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to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the
other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form
of religion ... freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." 3
These two opinions represent the first judicial attempt to read
the establishment clause into the concept of the "liberty" protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Both cases dealt with problems of
religious freedom and the free exercise of religion. The establish-
ment clause is explained in terms of that freedom. It means freedom
to believe and worship, while the free exercise clause refers only to
freedom to act in accordance with one's chosen belief. This was, in
part, the meaning attached by Madison" 4 to his original proposal'"
as amended by the select committee"" that "no religion shall be
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be
infringed"-the phraseology which Congress rejected in favor of
the Livermore formula. Madison cannot be cited as authority for
Roberts' interpretation of the establishment clause in terms of free-
dom to believe and to worship. First, his interpretation of the
rejected formula is not addressed solely to the establishment clause
but to the whole amendment. Secondly, the amendment at that stage
did not contain the free exercise clause, thus destroying the nice
parallelism of the Roberts interpretation. I cannot believe that
Mr. Justice Roberts would not consider freedom to choose one's own
belief as among "the equal rights of conscience." Thirdly, to adopt
the dichotomy suggested by Roberts would make meaningless Madi-
son's view" 7 as to the "equal necessity" of his proposed restrictions
upon state power, which contained no establishment clause. It can
hardly be supposed that Madison proposed to leave citizens of the
states completely free to act in accordance with their beliefs, while
conceding to the states the power to prescribe what that belief should
be! There is no suggestion that Madison so interpreted the Liver-
more formula on the establishment clause as finally adopted; and
such an interpretation of the clause in terms of religious freedom
cannot be reconciled with his understanding of the restriction which
he proposed to place upon the individual states.
Roberts' interpretation of the establishment clause, though in-
correct historically, would nonetheless logically justify its inclusion
within the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment: it
is fundamental to religious freedom that one be free to choose his
own belief and form of worship.
153. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
154. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1789). See p. 379 et seq. supra.
155. 1 id. at 434.
156. 1 id. at 729.
157. 1 id. at 730.
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Seven years later, in Everson v. Board of Education,1 8 the Supreme
Court was confronted with a case in which Roberts' interpretation of
the establishment clause proved inadequate. There a New Jersey
taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of state action authorizing
reimbursement to parents of sums expended by them in providing
bus transportation of their children to and from school, including
parochial schools. His challenge was not based on the ground that
this constituted an interference with the free exercise of his religion,
but on the theory that it was a "law respecting an establishment of
religion." It was obvious that there was no interference with his
freedom of belief or worship. The Supreme Court, therefore, at-
tempted to present a more comprehensive definition of the establish-
ment clause and, for the first time, to justify its incorporation into
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice
Black's justification for including the establishment clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment, while both facile and fascinating, is hardly
illuminating:
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
in the light of its history and the evils it was designed forever
to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions
of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to
the states by the Fourteenth.... The broad meaning given the
Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by this
Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious free-
dom rendered since the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted
to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state action
abridging religious freedom .... There is every reason to give
the same application and broad interpretation to the "establish-
ment of religion" clause. The interrelation of these comple-
mentary clauses was well summarized in a statement of the
Court of Appeals of South Carolina... quoted with approval by
this Court in Watson v. Jones... "The structure of our govern-
ment has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the
temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other
hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasions of the
civil authority."159
This represents the only attempt by the Supreme Court to state
the reasons why the establishment clause, especially with the broad
interpretation later given it,160 should be read into the "liberty" of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The reasoning of Mr. Justice Black
will, therefore, bear close analysis. Such analysis and a study of the
cases cited show that his conclusion, to put it kindly, is far from
conclusive.
158. 380 U.S. 1 (1947).
159. Id. at 14, 15.
160. Id. at 15, 16.
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(1) Terrett v. Taylor,"' decided by Mr. Justice Story in 1815, is
first cited to show the meaning and scope of the First Amendment as
elaborated by the Supreme Court. In that case Virginia statutes
of 1776, 1784 and 1785 confirmed to the Episcopal Church in Virginia
the title to lands acquired when it was the established church, and
also incorporated the individual vestries. On the ground that these
statutes were inconsistent with the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776,'"2
the legislature attempted in 1798 and 1801 to divest the Episcopal
Church of its glebe lands and destroy the corporations earlier created.
The Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the lower federal court
for the District of Columbia,1"3 held this attempt to be void as an
unlawful seizure of private property. The decision was not based on
the First Amendment-of which the Court made no mention what-
ever. Of the Virginia Bill of Rights guaranteeing religious freedom,
the Court made this surprising statement:
Consistent with the constitution of Virginia the legislature
could not create or continue a religious establishment which
should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the
citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or
to pay taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously
believe. But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed
to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of
every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establish-
ing funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for
the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead. And
that these purposes could be better secured and cherished by
corporate powers, cannot be doubted by any person who has
attended to the difficulties which surround all voluntary associa-
tions. While, therefore, the legislature might exempt the citizens
from a compulsive attendance and payment of taxes in support
of any particular sect, it is not perceived that either public or
constitutional principles required the abolition of all religious
corporations.""4
' *It is asserted by the legislature of Virginia, in 1798 and 1801,
that this statute was inconsistent with the bill of rights and
constitution of that State, and therefore void. Whatever weight
such a declaration might properly have as the opinion of wise
and learned men, as a declaration of what the law has been or is,
it can have no decisive authority. It is, however, encountered
by the opinion successively given by former legislatures from
the earliest existence of the constitution itself, which were com-
posed of men of the very first rank for talents and learning.
And this opinion, too, is not only a contemporaneous exposition of
161. 9 Cranch 43 (U.S. 1815).
162. VA. BML OF RIGYr § 16 (1776).
163. The case involved title to property of the Episcopal Church in Alexandria,
in that part of the District of Columbia which had been ceded to the United
States by Virginia.
164. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 49 (U.S. 1815).
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the constitution, but has the additional weight that it was pro-
mulgated or acquiesced in by a great majority, if not the whole,
of the very framers of the constitution.65
Of the other cases cited by Mr. Justice Black after this inauspicious
beginning, Watson v. Jonese"0 was not a First Amendment case and
will be considered below. Davis v. BeasonA'6 and Reynolds v. United
States 68 upheld the validity of statutes of the Territories of Idaho
and Utah, respectively, placing legal sanctions on the practice of
polygamy; both cases hold that the free exercise clause does not
confer immunity for practices otherwise criminal. In Reuben Quick
Bear v. Leupp,0 9 the Court refused to declare invalid a federal con-
tract with the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions to pay for the
Catholic education of Indian children at the request of their parents
from certain funds held by the federal government. These "treaty
funds" and "trust funds," though held by the government, were
considered as belonging to the Indians. They were not public moneys
and hence did not fall under a statutory prohibition against expendi-
ture of public moneys for sectarian purposes. Of the contract with
the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, the Court said: "It is not
contended that it was unconstitutional, and it could not be."1 0 The
Court further held that to forbid the Indians to spend their own
money for sectarian purposes, even though their funds were ad-
ministered by the federal government, would be an interference with
the free exercise of their religion.
(2) The Everson opinion then states that the "broad meaning given
the [First] ... Amendment by these earlier cases" has been applied
by the Court to state action involving an infringement of religious
freedom. Seven cases are cited, all decided since 1940, upholding the
free exercise of religion, especially freedom of evangelizing by Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, against state interference.1" A casual reference is
also made to Bradfield v. Roberts, 72 holding that Congress was not
precluded under the establishment clause from contracting with a
Catholic hospital for the care of indigent patients in the District of
Columbia.
(3) Against this background of judicial interpretation of the First
Amendment, Mr. Justice Black finally reaches the crucial question
165. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 51 (U.S. 1815).
166. 13 Wall. 679 (U.S. 1872).
167. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
168. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
169. 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
170. Id. at 81.
171. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Follett v. Town of McCormick,321 U.S. 573 (1944); West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 1943); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296(1940)
172. 175 U.S. 291 (1899)
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why the establishment clause should also be applied to the states vi
the Fourteenth Amendment. This problem is solved, neatly and with
dispatch, by the bland assertion: "There is every reason to give the
same application and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of
religion' clause."-, It is assumed, but not shown, that the two clauses
of the First Amendment are both interrelated and complementary;
and their interrelation is asserted to be well summarized by a quota-
tion from an 1843 South Carolina decision, cited with approval by an
1872 opinion of the Supreme Court-although neither case dealt with
the First Amendment !
In the case relied on, Harmon v. Dreher,174 the court refused to
recognize any rights to church property in a Presbyterian minister
who had been excommunicated and unfrocked by church authorities.
Together with hundreds of cases before and since, the South Carolina
court accepted as final the excommunication imposed by the church
synod. It held that any re-adjudication of this question by a civil court
would be an unwarranted intrusion by government into the internal
affairs of a religious body, to the detriment of religions freedom. This
was quoted with approval in Watson v. Jones,175 where the court rec-
ognized as lawful owners of a Presbyterian church in Louisville that
faction of the congregation which was recognized by the General
Assembly of the Church. In both cases, even though civil property
rights depended on membership in the church, a determination by law-
ful church authority on the question of membership was regarded as
controlling and binding upon the civil courts. Both cases rely on gen-
eral principles of American jurisprudence, rather than on constitu-
tional guarantees,'7 and neither case mentions in this context the
First Amendment.
The Harmon case certainly does not stand for the proposition for
which it is cited in Everson-that the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the First Amendment are so interrelated that both should
be read into the "liberty" of the Fourteenth. The first dictum in the
Harmon case, which says that civil liberty has been preserved by
rescuing temporal institutions from religious interference, is most
probably a reference to a peculiar South Carolina constitutional pro-
173. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
174. Speers Eq. 87, 120 (S.C. 1843).
175. 13 Wall. 679, 730 (U.S. 1872).
176. "That opinion (Watson v. Jones) has been given consideration in sub-
sequent church litigation-state and national. The opinion itself, however,
did not turn on either the establishment or the prohibition of the free exercise
of religion." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952). The
principle of the Watson case has been severely criticized by one authority on theground that it is destructive of religious freedom. ZOLLmANN, AMECAN CIVM
CHURCH LAW 198-235 (1917).
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vision"77 making clergymen ineligible for state offices. Such a pro-
vision today would be suspect as a violation of the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment"18-- certainly it would not be regarded as a
prohibition of establishment. Further, it is difficult to see what the
interrelation, if any, expressed in the Harmon case has to do with the
objective of the Everson opinion-the incorporation of the establish-
ment clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. Whatever interrelation
is expressed by the Harmon dicta, 179 it is at most some connection be-
tween the rescue of temporal institutions from religious interference
and the protection of religious liberty from governmental interfer-
ence. Does Mr. Justice Black equate "no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion" with the rescue of "temporal institutions from
religious interference"? It is ordinarily supposed that aid by the state
to religion may result in domination of religious bodies by the state,280
not vice versa. Nor does such freedom of temporal institutions from
ecclesiastical domination appear prominent in the meaning of the
establishment clause as defined by Mr. Justice Black in the very next
paragraph of his opinion:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
177. S.C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 23 (1790). The interrelation between this provision
and the guarantee of religious freedom (S.C. CoNST. Art. VIII, § 1 (1790))
becomes even more tenuous when we remember that it was retained from Article
XXI of the South Carolina Constitution of 1778; this Constitution also provided
in Article XXXVIII:
That all persons and religious societies who acknowledge that there is one
God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, and that God is publicly
to be worshipped, shall be freely tolerated. The Christian Protestant religion
shall be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established
religion of this State. That all denominations of Christian Protestants,
demeaning themselves peaceable and faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious
and civil privileges.
178. Madison so regarded such proposals: MADIsoN, Letter to Henry Lee in
2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 288 (Hunt ed. 1901). In fact, it is precisely where
there is an established church, as in England today and in the South Carolina of
1778, that such provisions occur, and there is a real need for a separation of
church and state. Where both are officially recognized as parts of one sovereignty,
a separation of powers is in order.
179. See comments in notes 177 and 178 supra.
180. See the remark of Mr. Justice Jackson in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (dissenting opinion), on this danger.
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organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between Church and State."' 81
The Court has never since squarely faced the problem why the
"liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment should include the establish-
ment clause of the First; and the cavalier solution attempted in the
Everson case is far from satisfactory. The rest of the story is soon
told. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,1 2 the Court
assumed that it was so included and expressly refused to distinguish
or overrule its "holding" to that effect in the Everson case.18 3 The
clause was there held to forbid the use of public school buildings to
conduct classes in religion for pupils whose parents so requested. In
Dorcmus v. Board of Education,' the Court made the same assump-
tion but denied the standing of a taxpayer to enjoin the reading of the
Old Testament and the Lord's Prayer in New Jersey public schools.'
In the recent case of Zorach v. Clauson,' 6 the Court allowed the New
York public schools to release, during certain hours, those pupils who
wished to attend religious instruction conducted off the school prem-
ises. The Zorach case again affirmed the "holding" of the McCollum
opinion that the establishment clause was made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is clear from these later cases that the problem of the application
of the establishment clause to the states has not been faced since the
Everson decision. Indeed, the problem has been largely lost sight of.
Since 1947, the Court has simply asked itself one question: Does the
challenged action violate our concept of the "separation" which we
assume should exist between church and state? If so, it will be held
contrary either to the establishment clause of the First Amendment or
to the free exercise clause, as seems best suited to the facts of the case.
Thus, in Zorach v. Clauson,"17 Mr. Justice Douglas flatly stated: "The
constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State." And
in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,"8 the test for the Court was
whether a New York statute "violates our rule of separation between
church and state." The offending statute was therefore banned under
the "free exercise" clause.
181. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
182. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
183. Id. at 211.
184. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
185. A recent New Jersey case, Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100
A.2d 857 (1953), held that the First Amendment's establishment clause was
violated when the Board allowed distribution of New Testaments after school on
public school premises by a Bible Society to those pupils whose parents so re-
quested. The Supreme Court of New Jersey distinguished its earlier holding
in Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 71 A.2d 732 (1950), appeal dis-
missed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
186. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
187. Id. at 314.
188. 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952).
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SOME CONCLUSIONS
(1) In the state ratifying conventions and the first Congress, the
relation of the federal government to religion was regarded as a prob-
lem in federalism. They feared, not only federal interference with
individual religious freedom, but also federal interference with state
establishments or quasi-establishments then existing. To them, there
was a danger of such interference with state sovereignty by affirma-
tive federal action to establish a national religion, or by negative ac-
tion disestablishing state establishments.
(2) This concept found complete expression in the formula finally
adopted for the First Amendment, as supplemented by the general
reservation of powers expressed in the Tenth Amendment. The free
exercise clause precluded federal interference with individual religious
freedom. The establishment clause prevented any federal interfer-
ence, whether affirmative or negative, with existing state establish-
ments: it reserved all power in this regard to the several states.
(3) As a reservation of power, the establishment clause is not per se
a constitutional guarantee of liberty. A clause which in effect told
the states in 1789 that they had all power over religion so far as the
Constitution was concerned, cannot in 1940 be read into the word
"liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that they have no
power.
(4) If Madison and the other framers of the First Amendment con-
sidered the establishment clause to be anything more than a reserva-
tion of power to the states, it was as a political duty imposed upon the
federal government. Even if meant as an additional safeguard to
religious freedom from federal encroachment, it does not thereby be-
come a constitutional right of the citizen. Hence, however wise this
additional safeguard may be, it is not in itself a liberty, and certainly
is not so fundamental as to be "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.5 ,
(5) Certainly the Fourteenth Amendment does, and should, protect
the religious freedom of the citizen against state invasion. I have no
fundamental quarrel with those who would achieve this effect by incor-
porating the constitutional guarantee of the First Amendment. This
guarantee is, however, expressed in the free exercise clause. At the
same time, any state action-whether called establishment or some
sweeter name-which infringes upon the religious freedom of the in-
dividual, should be forbidden to the states under the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. But state activity which does not in
any way infringe the religious freedom of the individual,21 0 should not
189. Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-326 (1937).
190. It is difficult to see how such infringement was present in the Tudor case,
cited in note 185 supra, where every precaution was taken to see that no em-
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be forbidden to the states simply because it happens to fit the Supreme
Court's idea of a "law respecting an establishment of religion"-and
still less on the even more doctrinaire ground that it violates their
concept of "separation of church and state."
(6) The inclusion of the establishment clause into the liberty of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court has no firm basis in
the history of the clause or in logic; and the sole attempt to justify its
inclusion has been unsatisfactory. Further, it is unnecessary. The re-
ligious freedom of American citizens has been more than adequately
safeguarded by state constitutions"' and laws. I believe that freedom
is safer in the hands of the legislatures and judges of forty-eight
states192 than at the mercy of varying interpretations by nine men
sitting in Washington.'" Let the Supreme Court, under the liberty of
the Fourteenth Amendment, prescribe minimal standards of religious
freedom: the states are still free to enlarge these standards by their
own constitutions'" and laws. But the added restriction of the estab-
lishment clause by the Court is precisely that use of the Fourteenth
Amendment which Holmes so much deprecated.' 95 It substitutes the
judgment of the Supreme Court for that of local representative
bodies in determining the wisdom of such social experiments as were
attacked in the McCollum and Zorach cases. It may eventually result
in an abridgement of the very religious freedom which the Court de-
sires so earnestly to safeguard. 96
barrassment came to pupils who were not to receive the Bibles. Nor was there
any claim to this effect made in the Everson, McCollurm, and Zorach cases--
although in these it is easier to see how such constraint might be involved.
191. The various state constitutions contain, altogether, more than 900 pro-
visions on the subject of religion and religious freedom.
192. Anyone conversant with the enormous mass of state cases on the subject
will agree with the statement that religious freedom has been well protected on
the state level.
193. As but one example of the extremes between which the Court has alter-
nated, compare Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), with
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). While the
movement of the Court has been toward greater liberality, there is no guarantee
that this will always be true. Meanwhile, it is disquieting to note that, prior to
1940, those aggrieved by state action relied almost exclusively on the guarantees
of religious freedom in the state constitutions; since then, almost exclusive reliance
has been placed on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
194. These are in general much more detailed provisions.
195. See his dissent in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342, at 344 (1921).
196. Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948), points to some concrete possibilities, which
could be multiplied ad infinitum. Consider, for instance, the extremely valuable
aid given to organized religious groups by the exemption of their ministry and
theological students from military service; and the very practical effect on the
free exercise of religion if the broad interpretation of establishment in the Everson
case were to overrule the holding in Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389, 390(1918), and United States v. Stephens, 245 Fed. 956 (D. Del. 1917), aff'd per
euriam, 247 U.S. 504 (1918). The problem is magnified when consideration is
given to the thousand and one areas where the state governments come into con-
tact with religion.
Washington University Open Scholarship
